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The EU in 2040: 
Envisioning an Inclusive Powerhouse for Innovation and Economic Growth 
Discussion paper 
The EU and its leadership is often criticized as lacking a coherent long-term vision on Europe’s future. Thusfar, EU 
policy in the area of innovation and economic growth has been primarily framed as an effort to close the so-called 
innovation gap with USA, South-Korea, and other countries. In this discussion paper, a group of EuroTech 
Universities professors in the area of Innovation and Entrepreneurship1 address and highlight several key 
challenges in the transformation towards an inclusive and sustainable European economy. In the absence of a 
long-term systemic perspective on Europe’s challenges in the area of innovation and economic growth, we 
propose such a perspective here. 
 
Drawing on what is known as idealized design, we engage in envisioning Europe as it should and could be in 2040. 
Idealized design here thus serves to collectively define the best outcome possible, by imagining “what the ideal 
solution would be and then work backward to where you are today.” This ensures we do not erect all kinds of 
imaginary obstacles, such as political and practical constraints, before we even know what the ideal is. We focus 
on five conditions at the EU level (in 2040) that may enable innovation efforts and economic growth rates in ways 
that other policy instruments cannot accomplish. In this respect, we believe the EU needs to move beyond its 
current policy frameworks in, for example, developing a creative entrepreneurial mindset among European 
citizens, promoting open innovation ecosystems and practices, and developing a European research area. While 
this type of policy may help to (somewhat) close the innovation gap with countries like the USA and South-Korea, 
it will never enable the EU to advance beyond this frontier. To be able to go beyond this frontier, we need to 
develop a unique European edge, an ideal solution that can inform and inspire EU politics and policy making. 
 
We focus here on the following conditions for an inclusive and sustainable innovation-driven European economy 
in 2040: 
- transforming the educational and research landscape, by allocating public budgets to universities that 
systematically connect research and education; 
- creating an ideal setting for young entrepreneurs and their innovative companies, to enable a virtuous 
cycle of new (academic) ideas, creating start-ups, scaling them up, and demand for and supply of 
investment capital; 
                                                          
1 The EuroTech Universities Alliance is a strategic partnership of four leading European universities of science & technology: Technical University of 
Denmark (DTU), Eindhoven University of Technology (TU/e), École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), and Technical University of Munich (TUM). 
This discussion paper provides an expert view of a group of professors in the area of innovation and entrepreneurship, rather than represent the official 
viewpoint of the (boards of the) four EuroTech Universities. This paper can be freely distributed. Please cite as follows: Foray, D., et al. (2016), The EU in 
2040: Envisioning an Inclusive Powerhouse for Innovation and Economic Growth, discussion paper, Brussels: EuroTech Universities Alliance. 
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- transforming the highly fragmented landscape of national tax systems into a simple and transparent tax 
system that fuels rather than inhibits innovation and growth; 
- crafting a well-functioning patent system and market for technology, to ensure appropriate rewards and 
incentives for innovators in the age of open innovation; 
- building and mobilizing local innovation ecologies, especially those in less-advanced regions, through 
smart specialization. 
These five conditions would create a European economy/society in 2040 that acts as a powerhouse for innovation 
and economic growth, while being inclusive towards less-developed regions and fully transparant towards 
investors, entrepreneurs and inventors. 
   
1. Tertiary Education and Fundamental Research 
It is widely recognized that a well-empowered and vibrant research university is the core institutional arrangement 
in any innovative economy. As an institution, the research university is unique in coupling research and education. 
Students at all levels are taught and supervised by scholars, and the latter are exposed to the energy and creativity 
of young students. Anecdotal evidence from each of our universities shows the central role of (teams of) students 
in spanning disciplinary boundaries to address new problems and in developing start-up projects with great 
motivation and creativity. Research universities are thus a crucial mechanism to generate externalities in the form 
of both human capital and basic research as “joint products” (giving rise to economies of scope and internal 
spillovers). This means that the two core activities – teaching and research – are mutually reinforcing and should 
not be separated.  
What has just been said seems almost trivial, but in the case of Europe it is not. Another form of research 
organization – the national research institute (or laboratory) – is dominating the research landscape in many 
transition countries as well as in France, Germany, and elsewhere.  
The importance of national research institutes in Europe is a legacy of the past, when many countries trying to 
‘catch up’ needed to quickly launch national research programs and existing universities were too poor to 
accomplish central research missions. However, as these countries have been moving closer to the technology 
frontier, the rationale for a strong “government labs sector” is weakening and new institutions are needed. Two 
key problems arise from national research institutes as an institutional form. First, they break the intimate and 
powerful relation between research and education. Second, the presence of a large sector of national research 
institutes is a major obstacle for developing research universities, since the former captures a large fraction of 
national and EU resources devoted to the formation of human capital and research infrastructures. 
The way the public research sector is organized and funded in the EU is, therefore, incompatible with the logic of 
innovation. As a result, there is a strong policy case for designing a process that will lead to more effective 
institutional arrangements in science. As Europe has moved to the world technological frontier, it should invest 
more in research universities in order to increase its innovative potential. In a world characterized by limited 
resources, this must be done by transferring funds from one sector to the other, or alternatively, by merging 
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research universities with national research institutes ─ as in the case of, for example, DTU, KIT and Wageningen 
UR. 
While the idea of allocating public resources (primarily) to universities that combine research with education is 
simple, its implementation is rather complex. The development of vibrant research universities is not obvious or 
trivial. It implies a variety of organizational and institutional innovations as well as new models for professional 
development of scholars. The most successful research universities are characterized by the development and 
deployment of very strong intangible assets ― including scientific and technological knowledge but also 
organizational capital, user-generated (i.e. student-generated) content, and human capital. Most of these 
intangibles are not obvious to acquire and mobilize. Therefore, there is a strong case for cooperation and transfer 
of practices between the most successful research universities and emerging universities elsewhere in the EU. 
 
2. Young Innovative Firms 
More than ever in the history of innovation, the capacity of an economy to generate start-ups and new ventures 
as well as to facilitate their growth determines whether this economy will be part of the next technological 
revolution (i.e. the so-called second machine age). Market entry of new firms and exit of unproductive companies 
are important mechanisms in the structural transformation of the economy. While strong research universities 
are central to stimulating the translation of academic ideas, inventions or discoveries into actual products and 
services, other factors are also crucial. 
Barriers to innovation for young innovative firms are well known, but not yet effectively addressed in the European 
context. One barrier pertains to external and internal financial constraints. A second barrier involves the 
appropriation of returns from innovation (discussed later). Other determinants, such as demographic change or 
administrative burden, also count but a recent study shows that the financial constraint is the main barrier to 
innovation for these firms. It is therefore crucial to ensure that enough money is available for entrepreneurs with 
good ideas. 
Moreover, today’s emerging firms need new corporate finance solutions that are different from the solutions used 
by established firms and also different from the solutions which were adequate to yesterday’s emerging firms 
(e.g., in obtaining bank loans for investment in new equipment, using this equipment as collateral). In case of 
emerging firms in areas such as the sharing economy, creative design or supply chain management, the 
investment is mainly in intangibles that can be less easily used as collateral. Thus, today’s emerging firms need 
financial instruments other than debt backed with physical assets. The US financial system has evolved more 
quickly to provide such tailored financing solutions to emerging firms, such as high-yield bonds, venture debt, and 
private equity. Europe still displays a relative underdevelopment of financial services for emerging firms (with few 
exceptions such as the UK and the Nordic countries). In short, while European countries have been tremendously 
successful at helping individuals to start-up firms (e.g. in the EXIST program in Germany), they have not been 
equally successful at scaling-up and supporting (potentially) high-growth ventures. As a result, many young 
innovative firms founded at leading universities have been relocating to other countries, preferably the US, or 
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have actively sought to bring actors from the US system (such as founder.org) to Europe rather than work with 
local partners to further develop their ideas and inventions. 
With regards to exit, most successful ventures appear to be exiting via a trade sale or an acquisition, with IPOs 
happening only in the rarest of cases and family-owned firms being handed over to the next generation usually 
seeing a decrease in performance. Accordingly, future EU policy may need to provide more opportunities to 
incentivize technology-based acquisitions when those have the ambition to leverage and/or further develop 
technologies developed by small young firms. 
A crucial policy issue is, therefore, to improve the EU financial sector, as a necessary condition for minimizing the 
access-to-finance barrier. In particular, high-risk financing and early-stage venture capital (VC) markets are pivotal 
and need to be reinforced. At the same time, there are reasons to believe there still might be a role for public VC 
programmes in addition to private VC providers. In this respect, the structure of VC investments makes them 
inappropriate for many ventures, for example when public procurement is critical in getting the venture off the 
ground. Moreover, the VC industry is limited in size: even in the US, VC firms back only a small fraction of 
technology-oriented business ventures. Last but not least, by awarding public VC funding to a venture, key public 
stakeholders signal the high quality and societal relevance of this venture, and thereby facilitate access to the next 
stage of funding. 
Overall, we envision EU’s innovation policy in 2040 to address the economics of young innovative companies by 
creating appropriate incentives involving effective corporate finance solutions, a strong private VC sector, public 
VC programmes, and a vibrant exit market. The EU in 2040 therefore thrives on a virtuous cycle of new (academic) 
idea generation, development of start-ups, and demand for and supply of investment capital.  
 
3. Transforming the Tax System 
At the heart of current innovation policies used by the EU as well as governmental agencies at the national and 
local levels are subsidies, tax incentives, and other financial instruments. These financial incentives are (partly) 
intended to reduce the access-to-finance barrier outlined earlier. At a more fundamental level, however, these 
financial incentives reflect the image of (motivating) people to row their boat upstream. Any attempt to address 
the European innovation challenge therefore needs to go beyond established notions of ‘innovation policy’, to 
transform more deeply rooted conditions inhibiting innovative and entrepreneurial behavior.  
A key condition here is the highly fragmented landscape of country-specific (e.g. income and value added) tax 
systems, which in turn sustains an enormous industry in the area of tax collection, optimization and evasion. Some 
of the key mechanisms of this industry are evident from, for example, the Luxembourg Leaks and Panama papers 
that illustrate how shell corporations are used for illegal purposes such as tax evasion and how wealthy individuals, 
including public officials, may keep personal financial information private. The current landscape of tax systems 
in the EU thus constitutes an enormous drain on the limited pool of resources available for innovation and 
economic growth, and as such have strong adverse effects on employment and real GDP. Moreover, the very 
notion of taxing income is highly antagonistic to the intrinsic value of work and economic growth in European 
society. 
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We therefore call for a European debate on the need for standardizing tax systems in ways that do not inhibit 
innovation and economic growth. In terms of the earlier analogy with boat rowing, the challenge is how we can 
redirect and align the flow of the river with the direction of our boats in ways that enhance innovation and growth, 
rather than trying to make the best out of rowing upstream.   
For example, one promising scenario toward 2040 would be that EU countries eliminate their (personal and 
corporate) income taxes, including gift and inheritance taxes, to replace these with a single-rate tax on value 
added or consumption ― also known as the transformation to a relatively simple and transparent system of 
output taxation. Such a system would be automatically “fair” in distributing tax among individuals (if you consume 
more, you pay/contribute more tax). Moreover, it would drastically simplify tax collection and thus make Europe 
in 2040 into the most attractive location world-wide to start and grow a new business as well as for any other kind 
of investment, for example in sustainable energy production and storage. 
 
4. Ensuring Appropriate Rewards and Incentives for Innovators 
The innovation landscape increasingly draws on widely distributed knowledge and open innovation processes. 
The transaction of technologies and other inventions among different actors has therefore become pivotal to the 
successful development of new products, services and (e.g. high tech) systems. Intellectual property (IP) underpins 
technology transfer between actors, by creating clear rights that can be transferred. This implies a well-functioning 
IP system, and a well-functioning market for technology, is critical to the European innovation agenda. 
A well-functioning patent system therefore is a catalyst for innovation. Compared to our Asian and North-
American counterparts, however, the European patent system is highly complex and fragmented. This situation 
creates a high level of ambiguity and uncertainty for young inventors and entrepreneurs. Although the patenting 
activity recorded at the European Patent Office (EPO) has experienced a dramatic increase in recent years, this 
increase does not necessarily reflect more innovation. Rather, in some industries, it signals the rise of ‘strategic 
patenting’ aimed at aggressively blocking business ventures pursued by others and extorting royalties where 
possible. This flood of patenting activity makes a complete patent clearance increasingly expensive and, 
sometimes, impossible—hanging over entrepreneurs like the sword of Damocles. 
Although the quality of patents granted by the EPO is generally considered to be higher than at other patent 
offices, the rise of strategic patenting suggests that patents may still be too easy to obtain. As a consequence, the 
inventive step threshold required for a grant should be significantly raised. The current focus of the EPO on 
‘efficiency’ in examining patent applications is misguided; European inventors and entrepreneurs need carefully 
examined patents, issued in a reasonable amount of time. 
Finally, we call for a discussion of the funding and governance of the EPO. For instance, the EPO is currently 
financed by the fees it collects from its ‘clients.’ This raises a serious incentive problem, since the EPO increases 
its revenues when it is more lenient to applicants. This funding arrangement does not provide for an impartial 
examination and may actually undermine the quality of applications. A key governance problem arises from the 
design of the administrative council of the EPO, which is composed of representatives from the national patent 
                   May 2016 
 
Page6 
offices. This is likely to encourage the preservation of national interests at the expense of innovation and economic 
growth. 
The EU should also play a central role in designing efficient markets for technology. The market for technology is 
a key mechanism of open innovation. However, such markets are plagued with failures arising from information 
asymmetry, lack of market thickness, and difficult-to-transfer property. Available evidence points to low 
transaction rates: even for inventions that the owner wishes to license to others, the probability of realizing this 
intention remains very low (around 5%). The problem is particularly acute in sectors where vertical disintegration 
gives rise to new specialized segments that are positioned upstream in the innovation chain. The obstacles to 
licensing impose two major types of costs: deals not done, leading to an underuse of IP; and incorrect pricing. 
Price signals in competitive markets are widely believed to induce behaviour towards socially optimal resource 
allocation. When prices are “wrong”, this mechanism is absent, which might result in rather poor outcomes. To 
develop and sustain more efficient markets for technology, policy makers need to: 
- mitigate information problems by increasing transparency through better public reporting of IP 
transactions, frequently providing extensive data on trade in technology, and reforming financial 
accounting standards for the valuation of intangibles; 
- promote the standardization of contracts and market norms; 
- develop the market infrastructure, including mechanisms for low-cost dispute resolution and risk 
insurance. 
 
In sum, in 2040 the EU must be able to draw on a well-functioning patent system and markets for technology, to 
ensure appropriate rewards and incentives for inventors and entrepreneurs in the age of open innovation. 
5. Smart Specialisation  
Finally, the so-called smart specialisation strategy (S3) addresses especially the innovation challenges of less 
advanced and transition regions (i.e. their poor capabilities and ecologies) in the road towards the EU as a 
powerhouse in 2040. For these regions, the point is not to invent at the frontier, but rather to generate innovative 
complementarities in their key sectors. These complementarities may be less flashy and less overtly innovative, 
and yet they ultimately constitute the key to inclusive growth. S3 does, as such, not have magical properties that 
can transform laggards into global leaders, but a S3 might transform less advanced regions into good followers – 
regions capable of allocating R&D and other innovative inputs, so as to lever the growth potential of knowledge 
and technology developed elsewhere. 
However, such an inclusive approach to innovation and growth does not only require a set of generative conditions 
(such as those previously outlined), but also specific capabilities and resources at the regional level.  In top regions, 
these capabilities are provided by industrial associations, large companies and universities through spillovers 
arising from research and training, diffusion of technologies to suppliers, new models of IP, and other open 
innovation practices. These spillovers constitute the complementary capabilities that many start-ups and SMEs 
can draw on, even if they have not contributed to their provision. In many other regions, however, these sources 
of complementary capabilities have never existed or have dried up, and large holes in their industrial ecosystems 
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have appeared. To cite Suzan Berger, “firms are home alone”: even start-ups with great innovation and generous 
funding cannot do it all in-house; they need suppliers, qualified workers and engineers, with expertise beyond 
their own. In many cases, however, the local ecosystem is too poor to provide all these capabilities. 
In less advanced regions, including those undergoing major transitions, regional innovation policy therefore needs 
to address the whole set of capabilities required to innovate in specific sectors and emerging fields. In other words, 
a policy is needed to support the formation of local innovation ecologies:  the dense network of companies, 
research institutions, specialised services and complementary capabilities that are mobilized to explore 
collectively a certain new domain of opportunities. This is the essence of smart specialisation. Here, research 
universities can play a central role in providing complementary capabilities, coordinating emerging activities and 
increasing relational density within the ecologies. 
To make things even more challenging, local innovation ecosystems can only thrive if they have access to and 
interact with (complementary) ecosystems elsewhere, especially those with resources and capabilities that are 
not locally available. The rise of digital platforms and communities across Europe and beyond can facilitate this 
type of interaction.   
                 *** 
As a final note, we point at the need for more transparency and accountability in how governmental agencies at 
the local, national and EU level design and implement innovation and economic policy. This can be achieved in 
two ways: pushing towards open data and conducting policy evaluation studies in a more systematic way. Policy 
makers often proceed on the basis of rather casual understandings, uninformed by systematic inquiry into the 
interactions between innovation policy, procedures, practices and their (short-term and long-term) effects. This 
policy practice is no longer acceptable – if it ever was. As such, the EU must create a culture of evidence-based 
innovation policy. 
Together, the generative conditions and measures outlined in this discussion paper may enable the EU to become 
the leading economy in the world, by capitalizing on its distributed and inclusive nature as well as exploiting its 
potential for breakthrough (social, fiscal, technological, and other) innovations. Evidently, each of these five 
conditions involves a “grand” challenge that is nonlinear in nature and cuts across many different jurisdictions. 
Moreover, this discussion paper is deliberately crafted to provoke a public debate on EU’s future in 2040, possibly 
giving rise to alternative designs and visions.   
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